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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR R. JOHNSON and EVA
JOHNSON, his wife,

,

Plaintiffs a'J'I..d AppellO/Ytits,
vs.

Case No.
8024

PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIF·T
CO~IP ANY, a corporation, et al,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appellants' Brief

STATEMENT OF FACT
The original complaint was filed August 4, 1950. On
October 30, 1950, pursuant to order of the court, an
amended complaint was filed which named additional
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parties to the action. On May 23, 1952, a pre-trial was
held before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, judge of the
Third .Judicial District Court. The transcript of the pretrial reads as follows: (R. 44-46 inc.)
"Be it remembered that the a:bove-entitled
matter came on regularly for pretrial on Friday,
May 23, 1952, at the hour of two o'clock p.m.,
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, one of the
judges of the above named court, the respective
parties being represented by the following:
APPEARANCES
"For the Plaintiffs:
LeGrand P. Backman,
Esq.
For the Defendants
Francis S. Johnson
and Banie W. Johnson and Ebba E. Finlayson:
F. Robert Bayle, Esq.
For the Defendants
Andrew Reid and
Mary W. Reid, his
wife:

Grant Macfarlane, Esq.

For the Defendants
A. R. Kartchner and
Ada Kartchner, his
wife:

David H. Bybee, Esq.

(Following is a transcript of the stipulation
entered into at the close of the pre-trial:)
THE COURT: This case is settled, and
who will stipulate the conditions of the settlement~ Who will state it~
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~IR.. BACKMAN: The settlement will be
that we will allow THE COURT: Name the plaintiffs, will
you~

illR. BACKMAN: The plaintiffs, Arthur
Johnson and Eva Johnson, his wife, will allow
Ebba E. Finlayson a claim of one thousand dollars on the uniform real estate contract and will
convey to Ebba Finlayson the property west of
the Fassie tract- isn't that it~
~IR. BAYLE: Yes, straight west.
illR. BACKMAN: - running the full depth
of the property, and a new contract will then be
entered into with Ebba Finlayson describing the
balance of the property within the fence lines .
.JIR. BAYLE: And to include the right-ofway.
:MR. BACKMAN: And to include one-half
rod right-of-way along the east.
~IR. BAYLE : And under the same terms.
illR. BACKMAN: One rod right-of-way.
:NfR. BAYLE: Yes, it's a one rod.
illR. BACKMAN: One rod right-of-way
along the east.
l\IR. BAYLE : And under the same MR. BACKMAN: Under the same terms.
:MR.. BAYLE : - terms of payment.
MR. BACKMAN: Of payment. We will
give to Andrew Reid a quitclaim deed for the
891\[R. MACFARLANE: We would like to go
around the fence line, so there isn't any question.
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MR. BACKMAN: Quitclaim deed on the
whole tract.
MR. MACFARLANE: Yes.
MR. BACKMAN: All right. That is within
the fence line.
MR. MACFARLANE: Yes, within the fence
line.
MR. BYBEE: Yes.
MR. MACFARLANE: Now, they had better give that to you, and then you give us the
warranty because there is those lots that will be
affected
THE COURT: Who is Dave's clients~
MR. BYBEE: Yes.
l\fR. MACFARLANE : Better give that to
Kartchner.
MR. BACKMAN: We will give quitclaim
deed to Kartchner of the property now in the
possession of Kartchner and Reid within the
fence lines.
MR. MACFARLANE: Yes, on payment of
fifty dollars.
MR. BACKMAN: Upon payment of the sum
of fifty dollars.
THE COURT: And you gentlemen agree,
Mr. Bybee~
MR. MACFARLANE : I agree to that for
Andrew Reid.
MR. BYBEE : I will agree for Kartchner.
MR. MACFARLANE: What about quitclaim from you~
MR. BACKMAN: Your contract is on recor d.
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~fR. BAYLE: We will join in the quitclaim
deed or give you a separate quitclaim deed on
behalf of Ebba E. Finlayson to the property
which is in contest on the south boundary of the
Ebba E. Finlayson property and on the north of
the Reid property.
:JIR. :MACFARLANE: Yes. Their quitclaim
may not be as broad :JIR. BACKMAN: Then we will give you for
Francis Johnson - the plaintiffs will also give
to Francis Johnson a quitclaim deed for a tract
fifty-eight feet in width adjoining his property
on the north.
~IR .. BAYLE: 58.7.
l\IR. BACKMAN: 58.7.
THE COURT: There is one other thing.
Then you two gentlemen are going to enter into
a new contract, aren't you~
niR. BACKMAN: Yes. We have recited
that.
THE ·COURT : Excuse me. Then shall I
just hold this case until you have made those
transfers, and then you will join in petitions to
dismiss~

MR. BACKMAN: I think that will be well.
MR. BAYLE: That is agreeable.
MR. BYBEE: Satisfactory.
No pre-trial order was made as a result of the hearing. On February 14, 1953, there was filed with the court
by counsel for Defendants Reid a judgment. (R. 39-43).
On February 14, 1953, plaintiffs filed objections to the
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judgment filed by the Defendants Reid. (R. 47-48). On
February 16, 1953, an additional stipulation was entered
into. (R. 71-74 ). On March 7, 1953, counsel for plaintiffs
filed a motion, notice and affidavit to set aside the
stipulation entered into at the pre-trial and asking that
the case be set down for trial. Said motion was denied.
(R. 49-52). On March 26, 1953, the judgment was signed
by the court. (R. 53-58).
On March 31, 1953, another judgment was proposed
(R. 61-65) and on March 31, 1953, plaintiffs filed objections to this proposed judgment. (R. 59-60).
Motion for a new trial was filed April 4, 1953 (R.
67) and denied April 23, 1953. (R. 68). Notice of Appeal
was filed May 21, 195'3.
STATEl\IEXT OF POINTS
POINT I. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS THERE WERE
NO FINDINGS OF FACT AND NO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FILED WITH THE JUDGMENT AND THERE WAS NO
WAIVER OF THE SAME.
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS IT IS SUPPOSEDLY BASED UPON A PRE-TRIAL HEARING TO
WHICH THE COURT MADE NO PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS
REQUIRED BY THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
OR IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IS THE "PRE-TRIAL ORDER" THEN SAID JUDGMENT AND ORDER ARE VOID AS THEY ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE STIPULATION PRESENTED AT THE
PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
POINT III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO VACATE THE
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STIPULATION ENTERED INTO AT THE PRE-TRIAL
HEARING MAY 23, 1952, AND IN FAILING TO SET THE
ACTION DOWN FOR TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS THERE WERE
NO FINDINGS OF FACT AND NO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FILED WITH THE JUDGMENT AND THERE WAS NO
WAIVER OF THE SAME.

The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide as follows:
Rule ;):2 - Findings by the Court.
•· (a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall, unless the same are waived, find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment; and in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. The findings of a master, to the
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. Findings of
fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on
decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any
other motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b)."

* * * * *
'' (c) Waiver of Findings of F'act and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions for divorce,
Findings of fact and conclusions of law may be
waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
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(1)

By default or by failing to appear at
the trial;

(2)

By consent in writing, filed in the
cause;

(3)

By oral consent in open court, entered
in the minutes."

It has always been the law of this state in accordance
with the above adopted rule, that unless findings of fact
and conclusions of law are made the judgment has no
validity, (see Thomas v. Farrell, 26 P 2d 328, 330, 82
U 535; Dillon Implement Co. v. Cleaveland, 32 U 1, 88
P 670, 671), and a new trial should be ordered.
Further, whether it be an action at law or in equity,
as the present case, the rule is the same. (See, In re
Thompson Estate, 72 U 17, 35; 269 P 103).
The record is clear that there was no waiver of the
making of findings and conclusions by the court and
no such a construction of the record as would fulfill the
requirements of a waiver within the above quoted rule
can be implied.
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS IT IS SUPPOSEDLY BASED UPON A PRE-TRIAL HEARING TO
WHICH THE COURT MADE NO PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS
REQUIRED BY THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
OR IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE JUDGMENT RENDERED IS THE "PRE-TRIAL ORDER" THEN SAID JUDGMENT AND ORDER ARE VOID AS THEY ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE STIPULATION PRESENTED AT THE
PRE-TRIAL HEARING.
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Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
••Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues
.. In any action, the court may in its discretion
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before it for a conference to consider:
.. The court shall make an order which recites
the action taken at the conference, * * * and such
order when entered controls the subsequent course
of the action * * * "
The language of the rule is explicit in that it
requires that: "The court shall make an order * * * "
It would appear that the same stringent reason for
requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law to be
made before entry of judgment, apply to the entry of a
"pre-trial" order. The present case is a perfect example
of the jumbled mess that can result when such an order
is neglected. The parties in the present case without
such an order are left to argue over the meaning of a
stipulation, read into the record, and to which stipulation each party attributes his own meaning. The very
reason for the rule is to obviate different meanings and
constructions being placed upon the evidence submitted
by the parties to the action.
If this court holds that the judgment rendered is
the "pre-trial order" then said judgment and order are
void as they are not supported by the stipulation presented at the pre-trial hearing.
In the first place, the stipulation entered into at the
pre-trial hearing May 23, 1952, was never intended by
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the
the
the
the

parties, and was never intended by the court, to be
basis for the judgment or "pre-trial order" which
court signed. At the end of the stipulation (R. 46)
court states:
"THE COURT: Excuse me. Then shall I
just hold this case until you have made those
transfers, and then you will join in petitions to
dismiss~

MR. BACKMAN: I think that will be well.
l'IIR. BAYLE: That is agreeable.
MR. BYBEE : Satisfactory."
It is thus quite apparent that it was the intention of all
parties and the court that the only action by the court
would be the granting of the "petition to dismiss" the
action. Nine months elapsed before the court again
entered into the record of the proceedings and that was
when a proposed judgment was filed with the court.
(R. 43). One only has to read the plaintiffs' objections
to become aware that the stipulation intended to settle
the matter between the parties was being given different
interpretations by the parties. How then can the court
take it upon itself to render a judgment, deciding for
itself what the parties intended~ The· portion of the
stipulation above quoted demonstrates that it was never
the intention of the parties to have the court render such
a judgment, and the court never intended to do so at
the time of the pre-trial hearing. The court should have
vacated the stipulation and set the case down for trial,
for whatever the stipulation meant, there was no agreement between the parties.
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The stipulation is ambiguous and cannot be made
to support the judgment rendered. For example, Paragraph :2 (R. 54) of the judgment provides that the plaintiffs shall convey by warranty deed a good one-half of
the property under the contract of sale before the purchase price is paid, and then Paragraph 1 provides that
plaintiffs shall enter into a contract of sale for the
balance. \Yhere the court can find that in the stipulation
is beyond comprehension. Plaintiff's objections speak
for themselves, (R. 47, 48, 59, 60) as they must do, for
there are no facts or evidence in the record. The only
thing available is the court's interpretation of an ambiguous stipulation. It is useless to attempt to argue that
legal descriptions are wrong; that the property to be
conveyed is not within the fence lines; that the plaintiffs never intended to convey a portion of the property
under contract without the full purchase price being
paid. The court precluded the plaintiff from doing this
when it made its own interpretation of the pre-trial
stipulation. It is ludicrous to state, as the judgment
does, R. 53, " . . . the issues being discussed by the
respective attorneys for the parties, and a meeting of
the minds having been arrived at, a stipulation was made
by the respective counsel settling all the issues raised in
the pleadings in said case, and the court being fully
advised and approving the stipulation entered into
by the respective counsel, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: * * * ."
POINT III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO VACATE THE
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STIPULATION ENTERED INTO AT THE PRE-TRIAL
HEARING MAY 23, 1952, AND IN FAILING TO SET THE
ACTION DOWN FOR TRIAL.

In addition to the reasons set forth in plaintiffs'
Point II, which are also applicable to the present argument, it is plaintiffs' contention that the lower court
abused its discretion in failing to vacate the pre-trial
stipulation and set the matter down for trial.
The law, with respect to the granting of relief from
stipulations, is fairly set forth in 50 American Jurisprudence 613, par. 14- Stipulations:
"Relief from Stipulations. The rule is
generally recognized that trial courts may, in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion and in the
furtherance of justice, relieve parties from stipulations which they have entered into in the course
of judicial proceedings, and that upon appeal the
determination of the trial court as to the propriety
of granting such relief will not ordinarily be interfered with, except where a manifest abuse of
discretion is disclosed. Courts have frequently
granted such relief in the case of stipulations
which the parties have entered into improvidently,
inadvertently, mistakenly or as a result of fraudulent inducements, especially if the enforcement
thereof would work an injustice. A stipulation by
an attorney as to closing the evidence and submitting the case may be set aside upon the request
of one of the parties on the ground of improvidence or inadvertence alone, if both parties can
be restored to their original status. In all cases
the power to relieve from a stipulation should be
exercised solely to promote justice. The making
of stipulations tending to expedite the trial should

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
be encouraged by the c-ourts and enforced unless
good cause is shown to the contrary. Parties will
not be relieved from stipulations in the absence
of a clear showing that the fact or facts stipulated
are untrue, and then only when the application
for such relief is seasonably made and good cause
is shown for the granting of such relief. If a
stipulation relating to the conduct of a pending
case is fairly made, it will not be set aside where
such action will be likely to result in serious
injury to one of the parties.
"The proper procedure to vacate a stipulation is by motion, and not by an independent
action."
The plaintiffs, being faced with a proposed judgment
(R. 39-43) which did not conform to their understanding
of the pre-trial conference, filed with the court a motion
and affidavit to set aside the pre-trial stipulation and
set the case down for trial (R. 49-52). It cannot be said
that any of the parties had relied upon the stipulation
to their injury because apparently the parties were never
able to get together under the stipulation and then "move
the court for dismissal of the action." No transfers had
been made or contracts or deeds entered into pursuant
to the stipulation. (R. 44-46). Certainly no one can
complain that they would have been injured if the case
had been set down for trial and a hearing had on the
merits.
The affidavit filed with the motion is short and
reads as follows: (R. 51-5'2)
"ARTHUR R. JOHNSON and EVA JOHNSON, being each duly sworn on oath depose and
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say that they are residents of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah; of lawful age and that they are
the plaintiffs named in the within action; that on
the 23rd day of May, 1952, when the stipulation
was entered into at the pre-trial of the within
cause before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, these
plaintiffs understood that if a new contract was
to be entered into by them as Sellers and the said
Ebba E. Finlays-on as the Buyer that the description of the property to be included in the new
~ontract would conform with the descriptions as
determined by George W. Cassity, Registered
Engineer and Land Surveyor, as to the fence lines
and that the new contract would be an agreement
to sell to the said Ebba E. Finlayson the real
property within the fence line description; that
the new contract would carry the same terms o'f
payment as the existing contract which calls for
the payment of Five Hundred and no/100
($500.00) or more on the 30th day of each December including interest at the rate of four per cent
per annum; that in entering the balance remaining to be paid on said con tract that the balance
owing together with interest on the existing contract was to be computed tq the date of the entering of the judgment by this Court; that in agreeing to accept the sum ·of $25.00 from the Reids and
the further sum of $25.00 from the Kartchners
that it was upon the advice of their attorney,
LeGrand P. Backman, who was not informed of
the fact that these plaintiffs were not in the
chain of title as grantors of the property now in
the possession of the said Reids and Kartchners,
and that the strip of land 86.33 feet wide and 880
feet long (approximately 1.74 acres) in the possession of the said Reids and Kartchners and
claimed by the plaintiffs had not been held
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adversely by the said defendants Reids and
Kartelmers and that the sum of $25.00 to be paid
by each of the defendant~ Reid and Kartchner
was wholly inadequate and inequitable in relation
to the amount of $1000.00 demanded by the said
Ebba E. Finlayson for 73 of an acre shortage
between the property actually within the fence
lines of the property in the possession of the said
Ebba E. Finlayson and the property as described
in the existing contract; that the plaintiffs were
not in any way consulted in reference to the conveyance to Reids and Kartchners as to any other
property than the 86.33 feet by 880 feet above
referred to; that there was a definite misunderstanding between these plaintiffs and their attorney as to a conveyance of any portion of said
property and these plaintiffs did not understand
that any portion of said real property was to be
conveyed to the said Ebba E. Finlayson at this
time; that said stipulation was entered into
improvidently and inadvertently and if enforced
will work an injustice on these plaintiffs; that
these plaintiffs aver that all parties should be
placed in their former status and the matter should
be tried on its ·merits and that all the facts and
circumstances should be brought to the attention
of the court."
A casual reading of the affidavit of the plaintiffs
demonstrates they were clearly mistaken as to the meaning of the stipulation, if it means wha.t the courts judgment says it does. Whether it is said that the stipulation
was entered into mistakenly, improvidently, inadvertently, or whatever nomenclature the court decides to use,
it is clear, beyond doubt, that plaintiffs never construed
the stipulation in the same way the court did. This
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coupled with .the fact that the stipulation is so vague in
its terms and was never intended as a basis for such a
judgment or "pre-trial order," makes it hardly possible
to believe that the court would not vacate it.
The injustice to the plaintiffs by reason of the failure
of the court to vacate the stipulation is apparent. Pursuant to the judgment (Par. 2, R. 54) the plaintiffs must
convey, or have the court do it for them, at least onehalf of the property under the contract of sale, and then
maintain the contract on the balance of the property.
In other words, the plaintiffs must convey one-half of
the real property before the full purchase price is paid.
This is ordered under the judgment notwithstanding the
fact that the original contract of sale (R. 19-22) provides
just the opposite. Can a court be upheld in such action
unless there is clear evidence that such was the intention
of the parties~ Yet, the lower court, upon the vague
facts presented in the stipulation, and faced with a motion
and affidavit clearly stating that such was never the
intention of plaintiffs, goes ahead and renders a judgment or "pre-trial order" and sets aside and violates
the provisions of contract of sale entered into between
the parties. The court has decided, without reason, that
the plaintiffs only needed half as much security for their
contract as was agreed to in the contract. The injustice
rendered the plaintiffs by the lower courts action cannot be condoned by this court. The lower court should
have a great deal of discretion in deciding issues as here
presented, but when· presented with 'facts and circum-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:~
~I

17
stanees such a8 in the present case, it is clearly an abuse
of that discretion when the court fails to set aside such
a stipulation and order a trial of the action.
Here again the motion and affidavit of plaintiffs
speak for themselves, as they must do, for there are no
facts evidenced in the record. The only thing available
is the vague and ambiguous stipulation entered into at
the pre-trial and the court's interpretation thereof. The
plaintiff~ are in effect precluded from arguing fence
lines, legal descriptions and correct contract terms.

CONCLUSION
It is plaintiffs' contention that the serious error
presented in this case is the failure of the lower court
to pursue correctly the pre-trial procedure. Pre-trial
practice is an expeditious and should be a sought-after
means to settle law suits. It is of equal benefit to client,
attorney and the court to settling complicated and vexatious law suits. However, it is this very benefit that
can also render such injustice to the parties concerned
unless the court is fully apprised and a complete and
detailed record made of the action taken. Party litigants
frequently settle their differences before a matter is
ever pres en ted to the court. However, once a court is
appealed to because of the failure of the parties to settle
their differences, it is the duty of the court to jealously
safeguard the rights of both pal'lties. Perhaps this
appeared to be a long, complicated and unnecessarily
vexatious law suit to the lower court and taxed the
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court's patience to the ultimate limit, still the procedure
that was followed at the pre-trial and subsequent thereto
dealt injustice to the plaintiffs which this court cannot
permit to stand.
Perhaps the fault lies with this court and it would be
well to review the rule of pre-trial practice and set forth
in greater detail the requirements necessary if this means
of settling law suits is to be pursued.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the
lower court should be declared a nullity and the case
remitted to the lower court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCULLOUGH
417 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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